cational societies in West Germany. 7 Karl Heinz Roth's Invasionsziel DDR of 1971 reveals interesting insights into the organization, but the book is marred by Roth's strident anti-Bundeswehr stance. 8 More recently, Dirk Schindelbeck made use of some of the available primary records, and Friedrich-Wilhelm Schlomann drew on his experience as a member of the psychological warfare section in the 1960s to discuss some of its work. 9 Schlomann stresses that FRG Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauß set up the psychological warfare section in 1958 to "immunize" the West German population against GDR propaganda. 10 Yet like Roth and Schindelbeck, Schlomann then focuses on the psychological warfare activities at the border between East and West Germany; in particular, the use of loudspeakers and the dropping of leaºets to undermine the morale of GDR soldiers. In this they reºect the media reporting on the Bundeswehr's psychological warfare battalions at the time. 11 The idea of "immunization" meant that Bonn's psychological warfare section was expected to look closer to home as well. The section was responsible for countering Communist subversion "from abroad and from the German underground" that threatened to undermine the will of the West German people to defend their country. 12 By focusing on the campaign to counter the GDR's "Vietnam Legion" allegations, this article reveals that the FRG's psychological warfare experts not only targeted the enemy in the East but also strove-covertly-to inºuence public opinion in the FRG as well as in France, Britain, and the newly independent states in Africa and Asia. East and West German archival records as well as British primary sources allow for an analysis of the methods used by the psychological warfare section.
In addition to highlighting the activities of the Bundeswehr's psychological warfare section, the article shows how an East German "information" campaign worked and what it tried to achieve. The article then demonstrates how West German authorities maintained an unofªcial network that enabled them to publish "camouºaged propaganda" and plant articles in West German newspapers authored by the psychological warfare section. 13 By scrutinizing propaganda practices at the grassroots level, the analysis here expands the post-Cold War literature regarding the use of propaganda in Western democracies during the ªrst two decades after World War II-literature that demonstrates the importance Western leaders attached to information policy and discusses broad themes of Western propaganda. 14 Finally, taking the lead from what Ralph Giordano has termed "perverse anti-Communism," the article also explores the extent to which West Germany's counterpropaganda campaign reºected the survival of essentially undemocratic traditions and convictions rooted in Germany's Nazi past. 15 A point worth stressing at the outset is that documents in the West German archives lend no credence to the "Vietnam Legion" allegations. The East German campaign stood reality on its head. The West German Defense Ministry's counter-campaign has to be seen in relation to the determination of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's government not to send any West German soldiers to Vietnam. Even U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson's pressure on Erhard to do so in December 1965 did not change West German policy. Erhard was acutely aware that opinion polls showed no support for Bundeswehr engagement in Vietnam. The FRG government was becoming increasingly worried about the growing student movement, and Erhard was so concerned about the toxic Vietnam issue that he did his best to keep secret the U.S. request for Bundeswehr units. 16 The GDR-FRG Information War One of the major tasks and preoccupations of the West German intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), was to monitor and assess the situation in East Germany. In the BND's high-level situation reports, GDR foreign and domestic policies, as well as the intentions of SED leaders, featured prominently. Several months after the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, the BND noted that public attacks against West Germany had risen signiªcantly, particularly from abroad. 17 By the mid-1960s, West German intelligence believed it knew the general theme of GDR "propaganda" only too well. The propagandists insisted that the FRG, driven by imperialist and neocolonialist desires, was a threat to peace worldwide. 18 By demonstrating that Bonn was essentially continuing the militarism of Nazi Germany, the GDR hoped to drive a wedge between West Germany and its allies in Europe. The East German regime targeted the West German public with similar arguments. The GDR emphasized its own desire for peace and denounced Bonn's dangerous adventures abroad as "national treason." 19 The "Vietnam Legion" allegations ªt perfectly into the West German assessment of GDR information strategy. Bonn's psychological warfare experts surmised that the GDR had launched a new campaign with four main objectives: ªrst, to discredit the FRG in Europe as well as in Asia and Africa; second, to portray the Bundeswehr as a tool of Bonn's militaristic policies; third, to popularize the slogan "Vietnam Legion" and thereby use General Trettner's connection to Hitler's "Condor Legion" to defame not only the general himself but the Bundeswehr as a whole; and fourth, to convince the West German public that the FRG was squandering the lives of Bundeswehr soldiers in the "dirty war" in Vietnam. 20 Were these West German assessments correct? Did they reºect the intentions behind GDR information campaigns? For the description of Vietnam as a "dirty war," see "Material zur kommunistischen Propaganda Nr. IV-13-965," 10 September 1965, in BW/2/5112, BMA-F. dia successfully communicated the intended-and fairly blunt-messages. An SED memorandum outlining foreign information policy detailed the issues East German media had to convey. The main aim was to "reveal" Bonn's aggressive policy and its role in disturbing the peace worldwide. To this end, GDR ofªcials were supposed to "expose" West Germany's plans for war, its supposed eagerness to acquire nuclear weapons, and its direct support of "imperialist" interventions. They sought to create the impression that Bonn and the "West German armament monopolies" were working hand in hand with "U.S. imperialism." The FRG was to be portrayed as a close ally of colonial powers and racist dictatorships. In the GDR media, Bonn's foreign economic and military aid was portrayed as a form of "extreme support for neocolonialism" that would "prevent national, independent, and democratic development" in the Third World. GDR propaganda ofªcials argued that the Federal Republic and Nazi Germany were of the same basic nature. One way to prove this was to show that former Nazi leaders and war criminals occupied leading positions in Bonn. In the view of East German strategists, exposing the Nazi past of the FRG's elite would reafªrm deep-rooted suspicions still prevalent among West Germany's neighbors and bring policy differences within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the fore, driving a wedge between Bonn and its Western allies. 21 The East Germans were well aware of how successful their previous campaigns had been in revealing the Nazi past of high-ranking FRG politicians. These revelations and an apparent rise of anti-Semitism in the FRG in 1959-1960 had sparked a public outcry in Britain and the United States. 22 Overall, the intentions of the GDR's foreign information policy matched West German intelligence assessments. However, West German analysts seemed not to understand the ideological nature of the GDR's claims. The voluminous records of the SED's higher organs have an aura of sincerity about them. Ofªcials at all levels seem to have believed in the claims made about West Germany. 23 Although GDR leaders knew they had to adhere to the set line, more signiªcant factors were also at work. On the one hand, dero-gations of the capitalist enemy as "militarist" and "imperialist" had been a key feature of Soviet-bloc discourse for decades. Party ofªcials did not question the truth of such statements, which ªt with their deeply held ideological preconceptions. The SED Central Committee explicitly described the claims about West German militarism as "continuing the polemical and aggressive discussion of the imperialist ideology and policy of West German monopoly capitalism." 24 For the SED, "truth" or "objectivity" in a positivist sense was of secondary importance, something the West German analysts never fully appreciated. Their counter-campaign focused on a fact-based approach and did not engage with ideas or ideologies.
The Bundeswehr's psychological warfare analysts closely monitored the "Vietnam Legion" campaign. They noted that East German claims about alleged FRG involvement began in June 1965 and peaked in September of that year, coinciding with the Federal Republic's election campaign. This could not have been an accident, Bonn's psychological warfare experts concluded. 25 They assumed that the GDR campaign was carefully planned and centrally directed, most likely from Moscow. 26
The GDR Campaign
Documents from the SED archives reveal that the campaign was centrally directed by the party's Commission for Agitation (Agitationskommission). However, the East German records do not indicate that the Soviet Union was orchestrating the campaign. The SED Commission for Agitation was headed by Albert Norden, the chief architect of GDR information policy. The commission had twenty members overall, including the directors of GDR radio and TV and the editor-in-chief of Neues Deutschland. The day-to-day work was coordinated by a smaller group of three members. Their task was to issue guidelines on the most important questions of the day and to stay in close contact with the directors of GDR television and radio and with the editor of Neues Deutschland. 27 The 1960s were the heyday of the Commission for Agitation. Norden, known for giving press conferences that denounced leading West German politicians as former Nazis, found the body to be a useful tool. The commission's "guidelines for argumentation" (Argumentationshinweise), despite their innocuous name, were far more than guidelines. They were binding instructions transmitted to the editors of all major newspapers and the ofªcial ADN news agency. 28 GDR television and radio received them too. The guidelines usually dealt with no more than three topics a day. They were not meant to be minutely detailed blueprints for newspapers and newscasts to follow. Instead, the guidelines focused on the issues deemed to be of greatest importance. They also left room for some creativity on the journalists' part to communicate the message. 29 This principle not only helped to guarantee apparent variety in the GDR media but also left no doubt of the importance of the topics selected by the commission. For example, Guideline No. 66, issued 12 June 1965, gave primary emphasis to the theme of alleged West German military involvement in Vietnam. It asked GDR journalists to take recent coups in Saigon as a starting point to criticize West German claims that the United States was ªghting for "democracy" in Vietnam. Newspapers, radio, and television should discuss West German preparations for military involvement in the Vietnam War. 30 This was the ªrst time the guidelines mentioned this theme, and GDR media heeded the commission's advice. Those monitoring GDR media in the West German Ministry of Defense noted that East Germany had started a new campaign against the Bundeswehr. 31 On 4 mainstream West German newspapers. 32 To build on this initial propaganda success, a senior SED ofªcial, Rudi Singer, cabled all GDR media outlets on 4 September at 1:00 p.m. He asked editors to continue reporting "all facts" about the participation of West Germans in the Vietnam War "at length and most prominently." 33 Journalists should make use of a recent Time magazine article and the parliamentary question tabled by Kohut. They should allege that Bonn was preparing to establish a "Vietnam Legion" as Hitler had done in Spain. Reports should stress that Erhard's government was trying to hide these preparations from the public. GDR journalists were ordered to disclose as much as possible to convince West German citizens not to reelect the Christian Democrats. According to GDR propagandists, the defeat of Chancellor Erhard at the general elections on 19 September was the only way to stop his "dangerous and adventurous policy" before it was too late. 34 The instructions from the Commission for Agitation demonstrate that the West German assessment of GDR motives was broadly correct. The SED initiated the extended coverage in East German media of alleged Bundeswehr participation in Vietnam in early September 1965 and strove to put the allegations into the context of the West German general elections. Moreover, on 4 September 1965 the SED employed the phrase "Vietnam Legion." West German analysts accurately construed the East German actions as a carefully calibrated campaign that would peak prior to the elections, but they overlooked one important aspect: the "Vietnam Legion" campaign proved the ºexibility of the East German propaganda machine. SED ofªcials could exploit opportunities when low-key GDR propaganda had succeeded in raising doubts among FRG members of parliament.
It is important to note that the Commission for Agitation's guidelines to step up the campaign were issued after these events. The parliamentary question and Western reports had created an opening for the GDR to seize on an issue that had been simmering since June. The "Vietnam Legion" theme also ªt perfectly into a general instruction issued by the Commission for Agitation in August 1965: When discussing the West German election campaign, GDR journalists had to "engage with" Bonn's "policy" of endangering peace. Articles were to prove, on a daily basis, the costs the West German people would incur if they reelected the CDU, "the party of division and preparation for war." 35 GDR radio and Neues Deutschland immediately jumped on Kohut's parliamentary initiative, even before the Commission for Agitation issued its guidelines. This showed the speed and ºexibility of East Berlin as well as the control of information policy by a small inner circle of GDR ofªcials. The editor-in-chief of Neues Deutschland, Hermann Axen, played a key role on the Commission for Agitation.
Although West German psychological warfare experts tended to overestimate the long-term planning of GDR propaganda, they lacked a deeper understanding of the motivation. The "Vietnam Legion" campaign, albeit important, was not one of the major GDR campaigns at the time. The Commission for Agitation did not issue any further guidelines on the matter in 1965. A truly high-proªle campaign would have generated many more instructions. An example at the time was the GDR campaign against the statute of limitation for prosecuting Nazi war crimes in West Germany. The campaign was meticulously organized, comprising not only media coverage but also agitation in factories and demonstrations in various East German cities. 36 West German analysts also failed to appreciate that both the statute of limitations campaign and the "Vietnam Legion" campaign targeted East German as much as West German and international audiences. The "Vietnam Legion" campaign in particular reºected the ideological divide and views of the main political enemy that had dominated German Communist discourse for decades. All leading party ofªcials had fought in the Spanish Civil War against Nazi German intervention, and the ideals and sacriªces of that war were engrained in the German Communist mind and frequently invoked in the GDR until well into the 1970s. 37 Norden's use of the Spanish Civil War in his book on the "making of wars" is a case in point. He devoted the largest part of his chapter on the origins of Word War II to a discussion of the "murderers of Spain." Later, in the section on the Vietnam War, he returned to the Spanish Civil War theme, comparing U.S. military help for the Saigon regime to Hitler's support for Francisco Franco. 38 Norden's book shows how the Spanish experience was used as shorthand for the aggressiveness of the enemies of Communism. Employing the term "Vietnam Legion" was designed not only to vilify the Bundeswehr in West Germany and beyond but also to resonate with ideological stalwarts in the GDR. The term was a battle cry that forged unity in East Germany and exposed the alleged neoimperialists in West Germany.
The West German Counter-Campaign
The existing literature on the West German psychological warfare section stresses that it sought mainly to inºuence East German hearts and minds. At the border the section bombarded GDR soldiers with loudspeaker messages. 39 Its members also used balloons to drop leaºets over the GDR. 40 The messages usually tried to undermine morale in East Germany and were designed to persuade soldiers and civilians to ºee to the more afºuent West. This part of Bonn's psychological warfare activity was publicly known, and the media duly dubbed Christian Trentzsch, the head of the psychological warfare section, the "balloon warrior." 41 Yet the "balloon warriors" reacted differently to the "Vietnam Legion" campaign. They considered neither East German soldiers nor civilians on the other side of the Iron Curtain to be possible targets for countermeasures. Instead, they focused squarely on West German and Western European public opinion-a sign that the psychological warfare experts only partly understood which audience GDR agitation targeted. Often, the West Germans found themselves on the defensive when GDR propaganda escalated, and they did little more than try to show that the East Germans were liars.
One of the reasons for this essentially defensive posture was that despite the FRG's close monitoring of the campaign from June 1965 onward, the dramatic turn in early September came as a surprise to the West German Ministry of Defense. An important omission in the ministry's ªrst press statement on the matter necessitated the more extensive counter-campaign over the following months. In response to the Bauernruf report that West Germans were ªghting in Vietnam and the subsequent tabling of a parliamentary question, the press ofªce issued a brief statement denying the claims and afªrming that no Bundeswehr soldiers were militarily involved in Vietnam, nor had the ministry granted "special leave" to Bundeswehr soldiers to go to Vietnam and ªght there. Reports to the contrary were simply false, manufactured by Bauernruf, a paper with close links to Communists, the statement added. The statement was issued on 3 September 1965, a Friday, which might explain why the ministry did not look more closely into the Bauernruf claims or at the evidence quoted by the GDR propagandists; notably, the article in Time magazine. Time, as Bauernruf and later GDR media pointed out, had reported that 23 West Germans were ªghting in Vietnam. The West German ministry's press release did not mention the Time report or look into it, nor did the Associated Press (AP) refer to it when transmitting a story to its clients on 3 September 1965. The AP focused on the West German denial but went on to say that the denial was a reaction to a report in a U.S. newsmagazine. 43 The AP story opened the ºoodgates. West German newspapers were keen to pursue it. "Is the Condor Legion Revived in Vietnam?" one paper asked when noting Bonn's denial of a report in the "generally very well-informed American magazine Time." 44 Another paper's lead sentence put even more emphasis on the alleged source: "The newsmagazine Time claims that German pilots are involved in the Vietnam War." 45 In reality, Time had never made such a claim. A report published on 23 July 1965 mentions that 23 West German instructors and technicians were working in Vietnam, but in noting this Time was merely reiterating a fact the West German magazine Der Spiegel had reported two weeks earlier. 46 Although West German media published corrections a few days later, the damage had been done. 47 Not only had the GDR campaign been reinvigorated, the leadership of the Bundeswehr also received more and more reports that its soldiers were beginning to ask probing questions. Many rank-and-ªle Bundeswehr soldiers were wondering whether the GDR's claims were true. 48 Even as ofªcials in the psychological warfare section were trying to explain to the Bundeswehr's command what had happened, news came in that GDR media were about to publish additional evidence for their claims. 49 Leo Habicher of United Press International (UPI) called the ministry to alert the Bundeswehr to the latest ADN report, which featured a supposed witness, Private Reinhard Mankus, who had "sought refuge" in the GDR. Mankus claimed that one of his Bundeswehr superiors had tried to lure him into com- mitting to a tour in Vietnam by offering a handsome payment of 2,000 Deutschmarks a month. 50 The psychological warfare section immediately went to work, probed into Mankus's career in the Bundeswehr, and found he had a very poor record. Mankus had joined the Bundeswehr in October 1964. He had been ªned numerous times for insubordination, was known for poor personal hygiene, and had crashed the car of an ofªcer on a joyride just a month before his desertion in August 1965. Mankus had an aunt in the GDR, and from her correspondence with relatives in West Germany the psychological warfare section learned that Mankus had probably been arrested in Poland. 51 The Mankus story forced Bonn's psychological warfare experts further onto the defensive. To recapture lost ground, they provided trusted journalists with background information, appealed directly to journalists to "act responsibly," planted material in regional newspapers, and published a booklet in German, English, and French that detailed the errors, lies, and distortions of the GDR's campaign. While the psychological warfare experts did not command the same resources as the vast state-run GDR media machinery, they counted on one important advantage. Citizens in Western countries knew that the mass media were independent of state control. If the independent media were to debunk the claims made in the "Vietnam Legion" campaign, GDR propaganda was bound to fail. The independence of Western media was thus a crucial part of this strategy. 52 Ofªcial denials would never be as powerful as an apparently independent report. The common element of the countermeasures taken by the psychological warfare section was the requirement that the public had to be unaware of the Bundeswehr's involvement.
West Germany was not the only Western democracy concealing its information activities during the Cold War. 53 When rebutting the "Vietnam Legion" allegations, West German ofªcials used techniques similar to those adopted by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and the British Information Research Department (IRD). The IRD, for example, stressed in its internal papers that interpretative analyses of Communist policy, including propaganda and tactics, were the most important material that the department distributed. Moreover, the background information produced had to be "as factual and as accurate as we can make it." 54 Bonn's psychological warriors followed the same principles. However, some aspects of the FRG's counter-campaign also reºect the darker days of German history. The psychological warfare section employed methods that had been used by Nazi propagandists in the 1930s; it also chose to fall back on anti-Communist information networks and writers who had played a prominent role in Nazi Germany.
West German Counterpropaganda Methods
The FRG's counter-campaign sought to debunk East German propaganda techniques. The psychological warfare analysts presented factual information and thoroughly refuted East Germany's allegations. In this they stuck to the "truth" as they saw it but resorted to emotive language. The documents do not suggest any attempts at distorting or inventing events-the content of West German information on the alleged "Vietnam Legion" was factual and accurate-but many of the means of disseminating the information were questionable or outright manipulative, none more so than the psychological warfare section's ªrst initiative. In the wake of the escalation of the GDR's campaign, the section published an article in the Sunday edition of Kölnische Rundschau, one of the major papers in Cologne, West Germany's third-largest city. 55 Published under the byline "Rundschau on Sunday's Own Report," the article afªrmed that the story of West German soldiers ªghting in Vietnam was false. 56 The authors cited the professions of the 23 West Germans Time had mentioned as working in Vietnam. Most were teachers, social workers, and doctors. The article seemed like any journalistic, fact-based report, but the tone changed in the ªnal paragraph: "This ['Vietnam Legion'] is a phantom army," the article observed. "Anything else is utter invention and distortion." 57 How the psychological warfare section managed to plant the article or who its contacts at the newspaper were remains obscure. It probably helped that the paper was known to be government-friendly and that its ofªces were not far from the Ministry of Defense. 58 In a second step, the FRG analysts prepared background information for journalists. Titled "Material on Communist Propaganda," this information series was routinely disseminated to trusted journalists, politicians, and activists at home and abroad, and it was to be used without attribution. 59 Providing "information" on Communist policies and leaving its use to the individual journalist was common practice during the Cold War. The USIA and IRD spread information in the same way. They shared the view that publication without acknowledging the government as a source increased the persuasive value of the information. An internal IRD paper explained the rationale behind this approach:
The basic principle on which we produce this material is that for the most part it is intended to be passed discreetly to local leaders of opinion in all spheres, political, ofªcial, military, educational, trade union, press, religious, etc. as ammunition to help them ªght the threat of Communist subversion in their countries in their own way. It is intended that there should be no attribution of this material to a Mission, Her Majesty's Government or indeed any ofªcial British source. 60 Like the IRD's material, the psychological warfare section's "Material on Communist Propaganda" series could succeed only if journalists cooperated. In at least one case cooperation was forthcoming. Franz Portnersberg of the conservative weekly newspaper Rheinischer Merkur based a full-page article on little more than material supplied by the Ministry of Defense-and without acknowledging the source. Portnersberg limited his journalistic contribution to stylistic improvements to the cumbersome language the psychological warfare section had produced. 61 Whereas the ªrst two aspects of the counter-campaign relied on the connivance of journalists, the third and main pillar of the psychological warfare section's information campaign dispensed with the need for reporters' and editors' cooperation. Using a technique that had served ultranationalist press baron Alfred Hugenberg well in spreading nationalistic propaganda in the 1920s and 1930s, the psychological warfare section managed to have provincial newspapers publish a one-page special report denouncing the GDR's "Vietnam Legion" campaign. 62 A private company distributed the special report in the form of paper pulp molds, known as matrices (Matern) in the printing business. 63 Matrices of complete newspaper pages were light, easy to ship, and an inexpensive way for small newspapers to acquire content. Recognizing the possibility of manipulation, U.S. and British forces in western Germany after World War II had promoted newspaper licensing that would establish only papers of sufªcient size that could survive without relying on matrices. Licensing had come to an end in 1949, however. Subsequently, more than 700 small provincial newspapers were established in West Germany, and many subscribed to services that provided matrices. 64 Christina von Hodenberg has convincingly argued that the West German public sphere turned more critical in the 1960s as the political situation in the FRG became more stable. Her work, however, is based on an analysis of national media. 65 In focusing on small regional and local newspapers, the psychological warfare section was targeting the soft underbelly of West German journalism. The section believed that the matrices of its special report reached more than 5 million readers. 66 Titled "'Vietnam Legion' or SED Lies Have Short Legs," the report stuck to the established line of exposing the ºimsiness of GDR claims. Photographs were included that aimed to demonstrate the exclusively humanitarian work of West German teachers and doctors in Vietnam. Excerpts of the article in the West German Communist newspaper Bauernruf, which had started the GDR campaign, were prominently displayed, as were reproductions of the misquoted Time magazine report and the Associated Press wire that had repeated the Bauernruf claims without checking the paper's sources. 67 The editors who received the matrices of the special report had no way of knowing the piece originated with the Ministry of Defense. This became apparent when the Bauernruf called for the newspapers that had printed the page to publish a counterstatement-a right provided by West German press law. Faced with this legal demand, the editors sent urgent letters to West-Pressedienst, the press service that had distributed the matrices. The letters show that newspaper editors did not know that West-Pressedienst was working for the Ministry of Defense. The editors asked the press service for the name of the journalist who had written the report. They also asked to be given more information. 68 Replies on behalf of West-Pressedienst were sent by Helmut Hermann Führing, a freelance author who lived close to Bonn. 69 Because he had authored matrices promoting the cause of the Bundeswehr before, he likely also wrote the "special report" countering the "Vietnam Legion" allegations. 70 In 1939, Führing had published a book on the achievements of the "Condor Legion" in the Spanish Civil War. 71 If so, the ministry was relying on someone with a potentially controversial past. Führing wrote two more books on military subjects after World War II, both published by a company owned by Paul Junker, who had been a prominent publisher in Nazi Germany. 72 Prior to founding the publishing house Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag in 1927, Junker had received a doctorate in philosophy at Greifswald University. His thesis supervisor at Greifswald was Hermann Schwarz, who played a major role in the ultranationalist German Philosophic Society (Deutsche Philosophische Gesellschaft) and who joined the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) before 1933. 73 Among the books Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag published in the 1930s was the ofªcial history of the SS. 74 The psychological warfare section counted on a network of people with backgrounds similar to Führing's in the most costly aspect of its countercampaign against the "Vietnam Legion" allegations: the publication and distribution of an 86-page booklet in German, English, and French. Titled Vietnam Legion? A New Communist Defamation Campaign in English and Legion Viet Nam? Nouvelle campagne de propagande communiste in French, the booklet was an extended high-gloss version of the "Material on Communist Propaganda" that had been produced for trusted journalists in late September 1965.
The German edition was published as part of a series of the defense press service Wehrpolitische Informationen. Ostensibly "neutral," the West German Bundespresseamt covertly funded this press service on behalf of the psychological warfare section. 75 Run by Lothar Lohrisch, the service regularly supplied West German newspapers with information on defense matters and occasionally with booklets like Vietnam Legion? Lohrisch was known for his farright views. His political convictions, coupled with allegations that he had diverted Bonn's covert funding to produce stridently anti-Communist publications, were more than the West German government could stomach when the Social Democrats took ofªce and embarked on Ostpolitik. Consequently, the ministry ended all cooperation with Lohrisch in 1970. 76 For the translation and distribution of the English and French editions, the psychological warfare section employed the services of Markus Verlag. The ministry's ties with this publishing house and its director, Helmut Bohn, dated back to the 1950s. In Nazi Germany, Bohn had been senior editor of Ruhr Arbeiter, the newspaper of the Nazi Arbeitsfront. Although Bohn claimed in his memoirs that he began to distance himself from the Nazi regime in the early 1940s, he maintained a circle of friends who belonged to the far right of the political spectrum. 77 Bohn's contact in Britain was the Independent Information Centre (IIC), founded and run by the Czech anti-Communist Josef Josten, who had come to Britain in 1948. Apart from heading the IIC, Josten was the director of the 181
The "Vietnam Legion" 75. The psychological warfare section found this press service an "excellent device" in its "special" public relations campaigns. Trentzsch to Küffner, 1 October 1961, in BA-K, B146/1714. 76. Ahlers to Weyer (drafted by von Schweinitz), 28 August 1970, in BA-K, B145/6906. Biographie, 1914 -1998 (Dresden: Edition Antaios, 2003 , reveals certain things about his views. Large parts of the memoir are devoted to "Jewish issues." Moreover, the memoir was published by "Edition Antaios," the publishing branch of the Institut für Staatspolitik, which sees itself as a right-wing think tank. See "Fortschreitender Realitätsverlust," Tageszeitung, 17 December 2002, p. 7. The institute is afªliated with a weekly magazine that West German authorities monitored for its anti-democratic subversive content from 1996 to 2005. Leading German politicians, among them the then-deputy leader of the Social Democrats, expressed concern about the publication. To raise awareness, they provided a detailed analysis of its anti-democratic nature in an edited book: Stephan Braun and Ute Vogt, eds., Die Wochenzeitung "junge Freiheit": Kritische Analysen zu Programmatik, Inhalt, Autoren und Kunden (Berlin: Springer, 2007). Free Czech Information Service (FCIS). Its most important regular publication was Features and News from Behind the Iron Curtain, which consisted of a collection of articles on the oppression of the peoples of Eastern Europe. This publication was sent to journalists and politicians. 78 The involvement of the IIC in the West German campaign demonstrates that the Ministry of Defense's use of informal networks extended beyond the FRG's borders. Conversely, Bohn was on the mailing lists of the British Foreign Ofªce's IRD, showing that the British used similar networks of "trusted individuals" in their work in West Germany. 79 Nevertheless, although the regular biannual UK-FRG meetings on information policy-established in 1959 and usually attended by diplomats and ofªcials representing the IRD and the West German Bundespresseamt-suggest some coordination of Western information campaigns, such cooperation proved difªcult in practice. 80 In the murky world of anti-Communist information activity, Western ofªcials at times had difªculty ªnding out who was behind a campaign or how trustworthy a privately run organization was. This became evident when the IIC ªrst appeared on the radar of the West German Foreign Ofªce in 1961. Josten had started a campaign highlighting the inhumanity of the erection of the Berlin Wall. The Czech émigré sent small parcels to diplomats worldwide containing a paperweight in which a piece of barbed wire was embedded. This barbed wire, Josten claimed, had been used in the division of East and West Berlin in August 1961. 81 In the letter accompanying the "memento," Josten offered to provide more paperweights for a small fee. West German embassies in numerous countries received these parcels, and diplomats there sought guidance from their superiors in Bonn on how to deal with Josten's campaign. 82 The Auswärtiges Amt, not knowing what to make of the IIC, asked its embassy in the United Kingdom for an assessment of Josten's organization. The West German embassy in London needed some time-and a reminder from Bonn-to produce a reply. Eventually the Auswärtiges Amt received assurance that Josten was a sincere anti-Communist and that the London embassy had worked with him on a number of occasions. The embassy even admitted that it had helped Josten with his paperweight campaign by giving him addresses for the distribution of 600 of the paperweights. These had been ordered by Inter Nationes, an FRG-funded publisher of material on German culture and society that worked closely with West Germany's Goethe Institutes worldwide. 83 However, neither the West German embassy in London nor the Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn seemed to know about the involvement of yet another West German player in the anti-Communist information game: Josten's "authentic" barbed wire had been supplied by Heinrich Bär Verlag. This publishing house was heavily involved in the "propaganda war" in Berlin and was behind the satirical magazine Tarantel, which made fun of the GDR. 84 The West German psychological warfare section supported the distribution of the magazine in the GDR and also had made use of Heinrich Bär Verlag in an earlier campaign countering GDR attacks against Hans Speidel, the FRG's highproªle general who had become the ªrst German Commander of NATO Land Forces Central Europe in 1957. For this earlier campaign, Heinrich Bär Verlag published a book commissioned by the psychological warfare section to counter GDR allegations that Speidel was behind the Nazi plot to kill the Yugoslav king, Alexander I, in 1934. 85 Bonn's embassy in London also seemed unaware of the British Foreign Ofªce's more cautious assessment of Josten. The IRD decided to share only a limited amount of its own material with the IIC and FCIS. The IRD regarded some of Josten's publications as useful but found that the IIC's and FCIS's reporting was "indiscriminate and wild," following a "rabid anti-communist line." Moreover, the IRD doubted Josten's discretion and therefore tended "to keep him at arms length." 86
His memoir, Helmut Bohn, Verschlungene Spuren: Eine politische
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The "Vietnam Legion" For Bohn and the West German psychological warfare section, however, two aspects made Josten's services attractive. First, the IIC published the booklet Vietnam Legion in its own name and thus helped disguise the booklet's role in the West German information campaign. Second, the center had been active since the end of World War II and had established a long list of contacts. Bohn told the Bundeswehr's psychological warfare section that Josten had sent the booklet to all major British newspapers, to prominent journalists, and to members of the British Parliament. Josten had also asked Bohn for an English-language article denouncing the "Vietnam Legion" campaign, and Josten had distributed the article through the FCIS in January. 87 The IIC also found in John B. Hynd a suitably prominent member of the British Parliament to write the preface of the English-language version of Vietnam Legion. 88 Hynd had been minister for occupied Germany and Austria from 1945 to 1947 and was now chairman of the Anglo-German Parliamentary Group. 89 In his preface he stressed that the booklet was contributing to "the cause of truth." He pointed to the "sickening" blatancy of the lies told by Communist propaganda and referred to methods used by Nazi Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels: "as Herr Goebbels knew so well-the most blatant lies, repeated often enough still leave their imprint on simple minds." 90 The production and distribution of Vietnam Legion marked the peak of Bonn's campaign to counter the GDR's allegations. General Trettner resigned in August 1966 because of a dispute with West German Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel over allowing trade union activity in Bundeswehr barracks. 91 Consequently, the psychological warfare section was spared having to defend the reputation of a general with a questionable past as a Wehrmacht ofªcer in Spain. However, the escalation of the Vietnam War presented the West German government with a serious dilemma. In the context of the Johnson administration's "more ºags campaign," Chancellor Erhard found himself confronted with the U.S. president's request for a West German medical company and construction battalion. 92 Although Erhard stressed that existing legislation meant that sending military units would be very difªcult, he
States were allowed to join the U.S. military. Moreover, under U.S. law immigrants could be drafted into the U.S. Army and sent to Vietnam, even if they were still foreign nationals. Immigrants could avoid the draft only by changing their visa status, which in turn prevented them from ever gaining U.S. citizenship. Consequently, several West German citizens who had emigrated to the United States did end up ªghting and dying in Vietnam. Confronted with probing questions in the Bundestag, the West German government stressed that the decision to move to the United States and join the U.S. Army was taken by individuals. 99 The West German Foreign Ofªce did its best to improve the information leaºets handed to West Germans who wanted to emigrate to the United States, pointing out that young men ages eighteen-and-ahalf to 26 who held an immigrant visa could be drafted. 100
Conclusion
The psychological warfare section of West Germany's Ministry of Defense did not limit its activities to the enemy in the East. The "Vietnam Legion" counter-campaign demonstrates that the section attempted to inºuence West German as well as West European public opinion. The counter-campaign also shows that the psychological warfare unit focused on immediate military concerns, particularly the reputation of the Bundeswehr and its generals. Ofªcials in the section seemed to enjoy a great deal of latitude and independence. 101 Coordination between this unit and other West German government branches dealing with "information," mainly the Bundespresseamt and the foreign ministry, was at times difªcult, not least because of the methods employed.
These methods mirrored those preferred by the British IRD and by USIA, which relied on "camouºaged propaganda." The West German psychological warfare unit provided background information to journalists of independent news media and also used private publishers to counter the GDR's "Vietnam Legion" campaign-but with one important difference. In 1962 the Spiegel affair had shown the emergence of an increasingly critical West German journalistic sphere that ªercely resisted government restrictions of media freedom. 102 Targeting high-proªle national media was not an option for the psychological warfare section. Instead, the section struck at the soft underbelly of the West German press and focused on regional newspapers. Resorting to methods used by Nazi and ultranationalist propagandists in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, the section produced matrices that were distributed by seemingly independent press services to local newspapers. In using this and similar covert methods, the section relied on a network of people who had played a questionable role in Nazi Germany. Some, like Bohn, had occupied important positions in Nazi newspapers. Bohn claimed to have distanced himself from Nazism well before the end of World War II. Yet he, like many others, including Bundeswehr generals who had fought in the Wehrmacht, remained steadfast anti-Communists who were keen to continue the struggle against the Soviet Union. West Germany provided them with a platform to pursue their ªght against Communism, and they seized the opportunity. 103 This led to one curious yet vital aspect of the "Vietnam Legion" counter-campaign: the defense of General Trettner against GDR attacks that focused on his past in Nazi Germany.
East Germany's propagandists certainly knew how to embarrass the FRG. The GDR's emphasis on the Nazi past of many prominent West German ofªcials continued to create problems for the West Germans not only abroad but in the student movement closer to home. Young West Germans demanded to know exactly what their parents and grandparents had done in the 1930s and during the war. Similarly, the escalation of the Vietnam War posed serious challenges for U.S. allies. For FRG diplomats, escalation made the defense of the Hallstein Doctrine more difªcult. As dozens of countries in Africa and Asia gained independence, the GDR tried to undermine the FRG's position by stressing West Germany's alliance with the United States and its "neoimperial" wars. The prospect of West German economic aid usually proved the better argument, but Bonn's policy of breaking relations with any state that recognized the GDR became increasingly problematic.
Not only did GDR propagandists know how to embarrass West Germany; they also showed themselves effective in acting. The "Vietnam Legion" campaign demonstrated that, despite the vast and strictly controlled propaganda/media apparatus in East Germany, its information policy could be ºexible and swift to exploit opportunities. Weak spots, such as the poorly researched initial West German press release that denied the existence of a "Vietnam Legion," were quickly seized on by East Berlin. West German me- dia were also closely monitored, allowing the GDR to make the most of reports about West German citizens ªghting and dying in Vietnam.
How effective was West Germany's campaign to counter the "Vietnam Legion" allegations? How was it received in the FRG and abroad? The psychological warfare section in the West German Ministry of Defense did not address this difªcult and possibly unanswerable question. The section's focus was on gathering evidence to demonstrate that East German claims were unfounded. Yet the psychological warfare experts could not stop the GDR from repeating the allegations. They could not stop West German newspapers from reporting them either, particularly the allegations that FRG nationals ªghting in U.S. uniforms had been killed in Vietnam. These false claims might have contributed to the increasing disaffection with the U.S. war in Vietnam. The growing student protest movement, particularly in West Berlin, regarded Vietnam as a pivotal issue that united disparate student groups. 104 Without necessarily invoking the "Vietnam Legion" slogan, left-leaning activists and students compared U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia with Nazi Germany's war in Spain. In 1968, a group of West German intellectuals and writers signed a declaration in Berlin declaring that "Vietnam is our generation's Spain." 105 The West German psychological warfare section failed to appreciate one important aspect of the "Vietnam Legion" campaign: its appeal to the East German audience and the Communist party faithful. This audience could not be affected by a counter-campaign that focused on convincing West Germans and the FRG's NATO allies that East Germany's allegations were patently false. Even today, a quarter of a century after the demise of the GDR, the "Vietnam Legion" myth is still perpetuated in publications of the German Communist Party (DKP) and its afªliates. These publications, such as the weekly magazine Unsere Zeit, repeat the allegations made in the 1960s and cite GDR sources as evidence. The author of most of the publications is Gerhard Feldbauer, who was Vietnam correspondent for the GDR's ADN wire service from 1967 to 1970. 106 But the phenomenon is not limited to just the hardline holdovers. Young Germans on the far left are also willing to re-
